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Abstract 
This paper considers the problem of trading uncertain emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol. We analyze a market structure that encourages the reduction of inventory 
uncertainty, although this option is not explicitly mentioned in the Protocol. According 
to the setting, parties to the Protocol are allowed to meet their targets by reducing 
emissions, buying permits, or reducing relative uncertainty. The goal of the paper is to 
account for the dependence in reductions of both emissions and uncertainty. Although 
formally a carbon emissions market may be restrained from the convergence to its least 
cost solution, a numerical experiment shows that it reaches equilibrium on its own. The 
necessary conditions for cost-effective solutions have been derived for the case of cost 
functions modeled with quadratic functions. 
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On the Costs of Reducing GHG Emissions  
and its Underlying Uncertainties in the  
Context of Carbon Trading 
Joanna Horabik 
1 Introduction 
Aiming to suspend an anthropogenic climate change, the Kyoto Protocol obligates its 
Parties (developed countries and countries that are undergoing the process of transition 
to a market economy) to reduce or to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared 
to their base year levels. The Protocol was drawn up in 1997 under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1998).  The emission targets, 
specified for each Party, need to be achieved within the commitment period of 2008–
2012.  
According to Article 5 of the Kyoto Protocol, Parties are required to conduct “a national 
system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks”. Guidelines for such national systems have been specified by the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). However, uncertainty is unavoidable in preparing 
such large scale inventories.  
Greenhouse gas emissions are generally not directly measurable and they are assessed 
on the basis of (1) emission factors from laboratory data or scientific calculations, and 
(2) activity data reflecting GHG related activities. Both quantities are uncertain. 
Uncertainties in emission factors are associated with insufficient knowledge about 
processes generating emissions. Emission factor uncertainties also arise from lack of 
relevant measurements and thus inappropriate generalizations. Activity data are 
generally statistical data. Uncertainties in activity data come from inaccuracies in data 
collecting systems and lack of relevant investigations (Rypdal and Flugsrud, 2001). 
According to Rypdal and Flugsrud (2001) and Winiwarter and Rypdal (2001), most 
activity data and CO2 emission factors for energy sources are reported with small 
uncertainty of around 5%. Emission factors for other pollutants are much more 
uncertain―usually more than 20%. The most uncertain sources identified include: N2O 
from agricultural soils, CH4 from landfills, PFCs and SF6 from aluminium production, 
HFCs from product use and N2O from road traffic (Rypdal and Winiwarter, 2001).  
It is anticipated that over the next 10 years inventory uncertainty can be reduced. This 
can be acquired, for example, through national research programs as well as through 
improvements in data collecting systems (Lim et al., 1999; Rypdal and Flugsrud, 2001; 
Rypdal and Winiwarter, 2001).  
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Uncertainty inherent in national emission reporting becomes crucial in the context of 
emissions trading. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol introduces emission trading in order 
to facilitate achieving national, agreed-upon reduction targets. The Parties listed in 
Annex B to the Protocol are allowed to sell their excess emission reductions. 
Environmental markets are regarded as an attractive policy instrument since they 
provide potential for cost-efficiency.  
The issue of carbon market performance under inventory (reporting) uncertainty has 
already been addressed in the literature. Godal et al. (2003; see also Godal, 2000) 
incorporated uncertainty into emissions trading in the following way. They assumed that 
uncertainty has to be added to the emissions when checking the compliance with Kyoto 
targets. Targets are met by investing in the reduction of emissions or uncertainty or by 
buying permits. In other words, an incentive-based mechanism was considered to 
reduce both emissions and uncertainty of reported emissions. The price formation 
process has been simulated following the scheme of sequential bilateral trade proposed 
by Ermoliev et al. (2000). This scheme offers to analyze the dynamics of an emissions 
market when bilateral transactions are sequentially made under changing non-
equilibrium prices. The advantage of this decentralized optimization procedure is that 
when bargaining on a permit price, parties do not reveal information on their cost 
functions. Godal et al. (2003) treated the reduction of both emissions and uncertainty of 
reported emissions as two independent processes. In the equilibrium, the permit price 
was equal to the marginal costs of both emission reduction and uncertainty reduction. 
The applied sequential bilateral trading scheme converged to this equilibrium.  
In this paper we consider the case of dependence when reducing emissions and 
uncertainty. To illustrate the approach consider the following example. In the case of 
estimating CO2 emissions, the problem is to achieve better activity data to reduce 
uncertainties; CO2 emission factors are well known. For estimating, e.g., N2O emissions 
this is the opposite. The main source of uncertainty is the emission factor. To reduce 
this kind of uncertainty, it is recommended to develop standard measurement methods 
(Lim et al., 1999). In both cases, the reduction of uncertainty would require substantial 
investments. However, the costs of these two improvement processes need to be 
modeled in a different manner. One has to distinguish between quantities that can be 
statistically surveyed only once (activity data) and quantities that can be repeatedly 
measured experimentally (emission factors). In the case of activity data (CO2), costs of 
uncertainty reduction are associated with absolute uncertainty. On the contrary, in the 
case of emission factors (e.g., N2O), costs of uncertainty reduction are associated with 
relative uncertainty. This distinction is significant as emissions trading is a cost-
effective problem and here we consider a market-based encouragement to reduce 
estimates of emission uncertainty.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls the scheme of sequential bilateral 
trading introduced by Ermoliev et al. (2000) and includes the case of uncertainty 
reduction as provided by Godal et al. (2003). In Section 3, we introduce relative 
uncertainty into the described model, i.e., we account for dependence when reducing 
emissions and uncertainty. The model is checked for convergence properties. 
Analytically, we show that the system becomes nonlinear and may suffer from non-
convexities. In Section 4, we derive conditions for non-convexity in the case of 
quadratic cost functions. We do this by determining two parameters and finding the 
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range of values necessary for non-convexity to occur. Consequently, the carbon market 
simulation exercise in Section 5 is performed for cost functions of emission and 
uncertainty reduction that are quadratic. In the numerical experiment of the bilateral 
sequential trade we focus on the analysis of both derived parameters. Concluding 
remarks are given in Section 6. 
2 Background Literature 
Montgomery (1972) proved that emission trading creates an opportunity to reduce 
pollution at the least total costs for all Parties. The mechanism can be feasible under the 
assumption that all the transactions are made at the same point in time and at 
equilibrium prices known to all Parties. This would require complete knowledge of cost 
functions by a central environmental agency and this fact places the countries in an 
unfavorable position, when bargaining on a permit price.  
Starting from this point, Ermoliev et al. (2000) developed a dynamic scheme for trading 
permits, where permit equilibrium prices are adjusted in consecutive steps. A scheme of 
sequential bilateral trade was analyzed. At each step, two sources with differing 
marginal costs meet at random. The idea behind this is that an emitter with relatively 
high marginal costs of emission reduction is interested in buying permits and, 
conversely, the low cost source is willing to sell its permits. When a transaction is made 
the seller reduces its emissions by the same quantity as the purchaser increases its 
emissions. However, since the permit purchaser exhibits higher marginal costs than his 
partner then, while exchanging the same quantity of emissions, the permit purchaser 
decreases its total costs more than the seller increases its own total costs. What follows 
is that total (aggregated) costs for all participants will be diminished after any single 
transaction. Next, another couple of parties are picked and the process is repeated. This 
will go on as long as there are two or more parties with differing marginal costs. It has 
been demonstrated that this scheme will lead the Parties to the least cost solution, while 
the information about the cost function of each Party’s emission reduction remains un-
revealed (for mathematical proof of convergence, see Appendix 1 in Ermoliev et al., 
2000). 
The issue of uncertainties related to carbon reporting has been introduced into the Kyoto 
framework by Obersteiner et al. (2000) (see also Jonas et al., 1999). It has been 
considered that apart from managing its emission level a party can also actively reduce 
its uncertainty level. The idea of a cost function referring to the reduction of uncertainty 
(cε) has been introduced. According to the model set-up this function depends on the 
level of absolute uncertainty (ε). The general aim of the model is that a country can 
choose between emission reduction and uncertainty reduction to meet its reduction 
target under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Godal et al. (2003) simulate a carbon permit market that considers the reporting of 
uncertain carbon fluxes. Applying the methodology of sequential bilateral trade, the 
market approaches equilibrium. The reduction of uncertainty is accounted for in 
absolute terms. The employed cost function models the costs that are involved in the 
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reduction of uncertainty (referred to by Godal et al. as ‘unreported’ emissions). Below 
we give an overview of the authors’ setting as background to the present study.  
Consider a set of Kyoto Parties (numbered i = 1, …, N) that participate in a permit 
market. Each of them faces a two-step optimization problem. First, they choose between 
emissions and uncertainty abatement for a given amount of permits. Similarly to 
Obersteiner et al. (2000), two separate cost functions are considered:  
)(, iiF Fc ―total costs for Party i of keeping emission on the level Fi; ( )iic εε , ―total costs for Party i of keeping uncertainty on the level εi. 
Additionally, let us denote: 
Ki―emissions of Party i in compliance with its Kyoto target; yi―the number of 
emission permits handled by Party i. The value may be positive (purchaser of 
permits) or negative (supplier of permits). 
Fi―emissions of Party i. 
εi―absolute uncertainty of Party i. 
The optimization task for an individual Party is formulated as follows: ( ) ([ ]iiiiF
F
i
IND
i cFcyf
ii
εεε ,,,min)( += )  . (1) 
Such that iiii yKF +≤+ ε  for Ni ,...,1=  . (2) 
Both cost functions cF,i(Fi) and cε,i(εi) are assumed to be positive, decreasing and convex 
in Fi and εi, respectively. The convexity of the function fiIND (yi) is assured as it is the 
minimum of the sum of two convex functions subject to a linear constraint. There is one 
solution to equations (1) and (2). Setting up the Lagrangian, it can be found that in the 
cost minimum solution the marginal costs of reducing uncertainty and emissions will be 
equal, indicating permit shadow price (λi). [The shadow price is the increase in the 
amount that the objective function would increase if the constraint (Ki) were relaxed by 
one unit and can thus be interpreted as the willingness of Party i to pay for an additional 
unit of emission permit yi.] For a given number of permits yi, the permit shadow price λi 
is equal to the marginal costs of reducing emissions or uncertainty multiplied by –1: ( )( ) ( ) ( )'*,'*,' iiiiFiINDii cFcyf ελ ε−=−=−=  (3) 
where Fi
* and εi* denote the optimal level of emissions and absolute uncertainty, 
respectively, and the apostrophes marginal costs.  This optimization step is performed 
independently by each Party.  As long as the market will not be in equilibrium, shadow 
prices λi will differ between seller and buyer reflecting the potential for trade (see also 
Figure 4).  
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The second optimization problem involves finding the permit distribution among the 
Parties that would equalize shadow prices among all participants, assuring the least cost 
solution for all of them. The aggregate cost of reaching the Kyoto agreement is defined 
as the sum over all individual costs:  ∑=Ni iINDiy yfi 1 )(min  , (4) 
s.t.  ∑  . (5) = =Ni iy1 0
Convexity of the individual cost functions fi
IND(yi) assures also convexity of the 
aggregate cost function, thus achieving the global least-cost solution. The applied 
sequential bilateral trading scheme is proved to converge to this equilibrium. 
3 Introducing Relative Uncertainty into 
the Emissions Trading Scheme  
Below we aim at investigating the consequences for the carbon market resulting from 
introducing a cost function that measures the reduction of uncertainty in relative terms. 
We argue that this approach is more suitable to analyze the costs of reducing uncertainty 
involved in the inventory of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., N2O and CH4) 
and possibly also their aggregate in combination with CO2. In practice, assessing the 
relative uncertainty of emission factors is difficult, not to mention assessing the costs 
involved in the reduction of it. The uncertainty of emission factors depends mainly on 
the emission source and can be associated with the general knowledge of the process. 
As already mentioned, the uncertainty of, e.g., CO2 emission factors for energy related 
sources is around 5%, for N2O from agricultural sources it is up to 100%, and for N2O 
from combustion it is up to 200% (95% confidence level). Experts derive this kind of 
information, e.g., from physical constraints on how large the variation may be, and also 
comparing different emission assessment results (Rypdal and Winiwarter, 2001). 
We assume that costs cR,i(Ri) incur to reduce relative uncertainty Ri, which is given by 
Ri.=εi /Fi. The sum of these costs and the emission reduction costs cF,i(Fi) contribute to 
the total abatement costs incurred by a party. However, operating under the Kyoto 
Protocol requires expressing uncertainty in absolute terms: Emission level Fi plus 
(absolute) uncertainty, εi = Fi⋅Ri, shall not exceed the agreed-upon Kyoto target Ki 
increased/decreased by a specific amount of permits yi (see boundary condition (7)). 
The first step is to find the optimal level of emission and uncertainty for a single Party 
given a certain amount of permits yi. A Party’s optimization problem is stated as 
follows: 
),(min)(
,
iii
RF
i
DEP
i RFzyf
ii
=  , (6) 
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such that   for iiiii yKRFF +≤⋅+ Ni ,...,1=  , (7) 
where  . ( ) )(),( ,, iiRiiFiii RcFcRFz +=
The approach can be also viewed to reflect the dependence between the reduction of 
emissions and their underlying uncertainty.1 In inequality (7) the uncertainty component 
εi on the left side is composed of two factors: Fi and Ri, each of which refer to another 
cost function: cF,i(Fi) and cR,i(Ri), respectively. This formulation is opposite to the 
optimization task (1), which we called the case of independent uncertainty and emission 
reduction (with fi
IND(yi)). It should be stressed that in our analysis we consider only the 
case of dependence between the reduction of emissions and their underlying 
uncertainty. An approach combining the two approaches would perhaps be more 
suitable to reflect nonlinearities. Nonlinearities also arise when one considers temporal 
detection of emission changes as discussed by Jonas and Nilsson (2001, pp. 34–35). 
It is assumed that the two cost functions cF,i(Fi) and cR,i(Ri) exhibit usual economic 
properties: they are positive, decreasing, convex and continuously differentiable. We 
consider the level of emissions Fi and the level of relative uncertainty Ri as being 
positive, which reflects reality. We also assume that Ki + yi > 0, i.e., we assume that 
countries do not sell more permits yi than their Kyoto endowments Ki. The Lagrange 
function is: ( )iiiiiiiRiFiii yKRFFccRFL −−⋅+⋅++= λλ ,,),,(  , (8) 
and the first order conditions become: 
0
0
0
'
,
'
,
=−−⋅+=∂∂
=⋅+=∂∂
=⋅++=∂∂
iiiii
i
iiiR
i
iiiiF
i
yKRFF
L
Fc
R
L
Rc
F
L
λ
λ
λλ
 (9) 
. 
Here, it is assumed (first-order approach) that relative uncertainty does not change in the 
case of an emissions change, i.e., that the cost function cR,i(Ri) is independent of the 
emissions level F. The Lagrange multiplier λi, interpreted as the permit shadow price, is 
equal to:  ( ) ( )
*
*'
,
*
*'
,
1 i
iiR
i
iiF
i
F
Rc
R
Fc −=+−=λ  , (10) 
where Fi
* and Ri
* represent the optimal levels of emissions and relative uncertainty, 
respectively. 
                                                 
1 This is the reason for the superscript [DEP] in fi
DEP(yi) in formula (6). 
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In other words, in the cost-minimum solution the ratio between the marginal costs 
'
,
'
,
iR
iF
c
c
 
depends on the level of optimal emissions Fi
* and optimal relative uncertainty Ri
*. For 
comparison, in the case of independent emission and uncertainty reduction, the ratio of 
marginal costs was equal to 1.  
In our set-up fi
DEP
 (yi) is a minimum of two convex functions subject to a constraint 
which is nonlinear with respect to the two variables Fi and Ri (because εi = Fi⋅Ri,). In 
order to learn more about the minimum of the Lagrange function, the second derivative 
of the function zi(Fi, Ri) has to be analyzed. 
Considering constraint (7) for the case of equality (in our approach there is no reason 
for parties to ‘over-comply’ with their Kyoto targets), we express the goal function to be 
dependent on Fi by substituting (7) in (6):  
)()()( ,,
i
iii
iRiiFii
F
FyK
cFcFz
−++=  . (11) 
Then the second derivative becomes: 
ii
iF
iR
iF
iR
iR
iF
iF
F
zi
i
yK
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
F
z
i
i +⋅+⋅⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+=∂∂ =∂∂
'
,
'
,
'
,''
,
2
'
,
'
,''
,
0
2
2
2  . (12) 
The first two components on the right side of equation (12) are positive as a result of cF,i 
and cR,i being convex. The third component is negative for the same reason, i.e., c’F,i≤ 0. 
Thus, depending on the values of the three components, the second derivative may 
become negative for the arguments for which 0=∂∂ iiFz .  
Similarly, we derive the goal function zi(Ri) and the corresponding second derivative: 
)()
1
()( ,, iiR
i
ii
iFii Rc
R
yK
cRz +++=  , (13) 
ii
iR
iF
iR
iF
iF
iR
iR
R
zi
i
yK
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
R
z
i
i +⋅+⋅⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛+=∂∂ =∂∂
'
,
'
,
'
,''
,
2
'
,
'
,''
,
0
2
2
2  . (14) 
Equivalent considerations as above indicate that the second derivative (14) can also be 
negative. As a consequence, the optimization problem (6), (7) may appear to be non-
convex and several local minima may exist. A non-convex cost function fi
DEP(yi) would 
also imply a non-convex aggregate cost function in the second optimization step (confer 
equations (4) and (5)). 
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For the permit market, this would mean that the achieved solution may not be the least 
cost one. The market may be locked in a local minimum. As a consequence, to reach the 
global minimum a central agency would be required that knew the cost functions for all 
countries. The feasibility of sequential bilateral trade to reach market equilibrium would 
thus become questionable.  
4 Non-convexity Problem in the Case  
of Quadratic Cost Functions 
In this section we investigate the possibility for the carbon permit market to reach local 
minimum conditions. Whether or not such a situation will occur will depend on the 
proportion of the parameters that we employ in modeling our emissions trading scheme.  
To reflect the reduction of emissions, consider a convex (downside) cost function, 
which is equal to  for 2, )()( iiiiiF aFbFc −⋅= [ ]ii aF ;0∈ and 0 for Fi>ai. The emissions 
level  shall reflect baseline emissions (also called ‘business-as-usual’ (BAU) 
level). These involve no costs as emission regulations are absent. 
ii aF =
We model the cost function for uncertainty reduction in the same way: 
 for ( )2,0, )( iiiiiR RRdRc −⋅= [ ]ii RR ,0;0∈  and 0)(, =iiR Rc  for . As above, R0,i 
indicates the ‘baseline’ level for relative uncertainty level (i.e., no costs incurred).   
ii RR ,0>
Consider the zi(Fi) according to equation (11) with cF,i(Fi) and cR,i(Ri) as characterized 
above. We require the first derivative of zi(Fi) to be equal zero:  ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 2,034 =+⋅−⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅− ii
i
i
iiii
i
i
iii yK
b
d
FyKR
b
d
FaF .  (15) 
Normalizing Fi upon ai, i.e., i
i
i x
a
F = , and denoting for convenience two non-
dimensional parameters, ( )( )
( )ii iii
iii
ii
i
i
Ra
yK
yKR
ba
d
,0
,03
1
1
++=
++=
γ
α
 (16) 
we obtain: ( ) ( ) 013 =−+− iiiii xxx γα , (17) 
where , 0>ix 0,0 >> ii γα . We get a 4th degree equation involving the two parameters 
αi and γi. We now determine the (necessary) conditions (i.e., parameter values) for a 
two-minima solution. Below we provide the answer without solving equation (17) 
analytically, which can be written as a difference: 
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( ) ( ) 013 =−−− iiiii xxx γα . (18) 
As it becomes clear below, we can consider the expression ( )iii x γα −  as the tangent 
line to the function , which allows determining the parameters αi and γi. 
However, the crucial point of the analysis is to evaluate the tangent to the function 
 so that we can draw conclusions about its minima. The standard analysis of 
 shows that the function possesses two points of inflection, namely, 
( ii xx −13 )))( ii xx −13 ( ii xx −13 0=ix  
and 
2
1=ix . Because of xi > 0, we focus on 
2
1=ix . For 
2
1<ix , the expression 
 is concave, for ( ii xx −13 )
2
1>ix  it is convex (see Figure 1). This results in a tangent 
line at 
2
1=ix  that must lie above ( )ii xx −13  for 
2
1>ix , and below  for (ix −13 )ix
2
1<ix . This fact is sufficient to elaborate further on equation (18). In order to 
determine the tangent line of ( )ixix −13  at 
2
1=ix , we calculate its ordinate at 
2
1=ix , 
i.e., ( )
16
1
1
3
ix
2
1 =− =ixix , and its slope at this point, i.e., ( )[ ] 4113 − ix
2
1
' ==ixx .  One 
straight line exists, whose slope is 
4
1
 and which passes through ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ 21 161, . Thus, we 
obtain ( )
16
1−i
4
1=− ii xx γiα , which results in αi  =  γi  = 0.25 (see Figure 1). 
For 25.0=iα  and 25.0=iγ  equation (18) exhibits only one positive solution in the 
specified domain (i.e., 
2
1=ix ). Equation (18) can exhibit more than one solution in the 
domain only for both 25.0<iα  and 25.0<iγ  which, however, constitutes a necessary, 
not a sufficient, condition. 
The parameter iγ  is well-suited for a straightforward, intuitive interpretation. It reflects 
the ratio between (i) the Kyoto emissions target plus the traded emission permits 
[ ] and (ii) the BAU emissions level plus its absolute uncertainty [ii yK + ( )ii Ra ,01+⋅ ]. 
Because of ( ii
i
i
i
i
i
i )RT1
a
K
R1
T1
a
K −+≈++γ i = , where iiaK  reflects the ratio of agreed 
Kyoto to BAU emissions and 
i
i
i
K
y
T =  the ratio of traded emission permits to Kyoto 
emissions, the condition 25.0<iγ  approximately calls for about or more than a 75% 
reduction from the BAU emissions level. To gain further insight into the range of values 
for the parameters αi and γi, we present the results of a simulation exercise in the next 
section. 
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 Figure 1: First derivative of the goal function zi(Fi) as well as its individual 
components expressed by means of a non-dimensional variable 
i
i
a
x = iF  and 
parameters αi, γi (αi  =  γi  = 0.25). 
5 Numerical Exercise  
In the numerical part, we analyze the parameters αi and γi for a simulation of the Kyoto 
market. Each parameter depends on the amount of permits held by a party. This implies 
that we need to trace the whole process of convergence―starting from the initial state 
and finishing at equilibrium. We use the sequential bilateral trading scheme to solve the 
optimization task of permit allocation on the market with the option to reduce emissions 
or relative uncertainty or both. We do not elaborate on the details of the convergence 
procedure itself as this kind of analysis has been already provided by Godal et al. (2003; 
see also Godal, 2000). However, we explain what is different in our specific simulation 
case. Generally, we focus on the afore-mentioned parameters which indicate whether 
the market can be locked in a local solution. 
5.1 Data 
We employ data that stem from emission abatement cost functions, derived with the 
help of the MERGE model and were provided by Godal and Klaassen (2003). The cost 
functions have been estimated for five Kyoto regions: the US; OECD Europe (OECDE); 
Japan; Canada, Australia and New Zealand combined (CANZ); and Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union combined (EEFSU). In our case, linear marginal cost functions 
were fitted to the data. The parameters for the emission and uncertainty reduction cost 
functions and other key figures are shown in Table 1. Data on the initial level of 
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uncertainty R0 are based on Godal (2000) and  Rypdal and Winiwarter (2001). The 
applied version of the MERGE model accounts for energy related CO2 emissions. 
Monetary units refer to US dollars as of 1997. 
Table 1: Kyoto target and cost function parameters for emissions and uncertainty 
reductions with reference to 2010.  Sources: Godal and Klaassen (2003) for 
Ki, ai, bi of all Kyoto regions except CANZ; Godal (2000) and Rypdal and 
Winiwarter (2001) for R0,i, R0,i of CANZ. 
 Kyoto target Initial emissions (BAU ) 
Cost function 
parameter 
Initial 
uncertainty 
Variable Ki ai bi R0,i 
Unit MtC/yr MtC/yr MUS$/(MtC/yr)2 1 
US 1251 1820.3 0.2755 0.13 
OECDE   860 1038.0 0.9065 0.20 
Japan   258   350.0 2.4665 0.15 
CANZ   215   312.7 1.1080 0.20 
EEFSU 1314   898.6 0.7845 0.30 
Total 3898 4419.6   
Note: The values are slightly different to those of the UNFCCC database. 
Information of costs associated with the reduction of relative uncertainty is very limited. 
Therefore, we employ the simplifying assumption that costs of relative uncertainty 
reduction at any level Ri
1 relative to the initial uncertainty R0,i are dependent on costs of 
emission reduction according to the formula: 
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11 = . This formulation stems from the concept employed in (Godal et al., 
2003) that the marginal cost of absolute uncertainty reduction  at any level 
relative to the initial uncertainty 
( )iic εε' ,
i,0ε  is equal to the marginal cost of emission reduction 
 at the same percentage of the BAU level, i.e., ( )iiF Fc ' ,
11
,,
iiii FF
i
iF
i
i
F
cc
== ∂∂=∂∂ εεεε  (20) 
with 
i
i
i
i
a
F 1
,0
1 =εε .  Godal et al. (2003) consider the cost function of absolute uncertainty 
reduction ( )iic εε ,  , which is modeled as a downside function as well: 
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(20) they obtain ( )1iii1ii e2)aF(b2 ε=− . (21) 0ε−
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i,0
1
ii1
i
a
F εε= , we find iiii ae 0ε= b, . 
In our case of relative uncertainty cost function cR,I in equation (19), we assume that 
when reducing uncertainty we keep the emission level constant, we also assume that we 
keep it at level ai. Evaluating equation (19) we finally obtain ( )
i
ii
i
R
ba
d
,0
2 ⋅= . (22) 
5.2 Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the first step to optimize equations (6) and (7) before any 
transaction has been made (yi = 0 MtC/yr). Each region chooses its optimal level of 
emissions Fi
* and relative uncertainty Ri
*, which together (Fi
*
+ Fi
*
 Ri
*) contribute to the 
region’s Kyoto target Ki. Shadow prices λi vary among market participants showing 
potential for profitable trades. Japan exhibits the highest shadow price of 527 $/tC.  The 
EEFSU does not need to carry out any abatement in order to comply with the target. 
Thus, the shadow price is 0 $/tC. Hence emissions and relative uncertainty are equal to 
its baseline levels ai and R0,i , respectively.  
Table 2: Situation before trade, after optimizing at a party level between emissions 
and uncertainty (optimization results according to equations (6) and (7) with 
yi = 0). 
 
Emis-
sions 
Relative 
uncertainty 
Shadow 
price 
Marginal 
cost of 
emission 
reduction 
Marginal 
cost of 
uncertainty 
reduction 
Total cost  αi γi 
Variable Fi* Ri* λi ( )*,' iiF Fc ( )*iR,' iRc  ( ) ( )**, , iRii RicF + Fc    
Units MtC/yr 1 $/tC $/tC $ MUS$ 1 1 
US 1134   0.102 343 -378 -388889 134 818 5.97 0.61 
OECDE   738   0.164 466 -543 -344351   87 459 4.97 0.69 
Japan   230   0.119 527 -590 -121384   37 119 5.65 0.64 
CANZ   185   0.158 243 -282   -45132   18 842 4.13 0.57 
EEFSU   898 0.30 0 0 0 0 6.34 1.12 
Total     278 238   
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As mentioned in Section 2, the shadow price λi reflects the willingness to pay for an 
additional permit, i.e., for relaxing the constraint (7) by one unit. The shadow price is 
different from the marginal abatement costs ( ) ( )*' F, iiFc  and *' R, iiRc , which reflect the 
willingness to pay for an additional unit of reduced emissions or relative uncertainty, 
respectively (confer equation 10). Marginal costs of emission and uncertainty reduction 
are also depicted in Table 2. Total costs before trading amount to 278 238 MUS$. 
Following equation (16), α and γ are calculated for each Kyoto region to check whether 
they are lower than 0.25. Regarding the parameter di in the cost function for uncertainty 
reduction (confer equation (22)), we can express αi as: ( )( )
ii
iii
i
aR
yKR
,0
,01 ++=α , (23) 
that is, the ratio between (i) the emissions level (Ki +yi) augmented by the relative 
uncertainty that refers to the BAU level (1+R0,i ), and (ii) the uncertain part of BAU 
emissions (R0,i ai). Table 2 shows that before trade α ranges from 4.13 (CANZ) to 6.34 
(EEFSU), while γi ranges from 0.57 (CANZ) to 1.12 (EEFSU). γ for the EEFSU Kyoto 
region is greater than 1 because it does not need to strive for any abatement in order to 
comply with its Kyoto target. In summary, the Kyoto regions exhibit α and γ values 
before trade that are (considerably) greater than the threshold of 0.25.  
Next, we simulate the sequential bilateral trading scheme. At each step two Kyoto 
regions are picked at random. For an appointed amount of permits exchanged in the step 
the regions compare their shadow prices λi. If they differ, it is mutually beneficial to 
exchange permits. Both regions end up with new permits yi and thus they again optimize 
between emission and relative uncertainty reduction, i.e., the initial optimization step is 
repeated for the two parties involved in the trading. Then the next two Kyoto regions are 
randomly selected and the process is repeated. The procedure stops when the shadow 
prices of all Kyoto participants are equal. This indicates a minimum for the second 
optimization task. However, if αi < 0.25 and γi  < 0.25 for any single participant, the 
determined minimum can be a local one, and not global.  
Both αi and γi depend linearly on yi., the amount of traded permits. In our simulation it is 
virtually impossible for αi to become as small as 0.25. Notwithstanding, we analyze the 
trading procedure to make sure that the conclusions are robust. Figure 2 shows the 
amount of emission permits yi traded by each Kyoto participant, while Figure 3 depicts 
the values that αi and γi  take on during the transaction process. 
In our case a non-convex solution does not exist. The parameter αi is not smaller than 3 
and γi not smaller than 0.45. The market reaches equilibrium on its own (confer Table 
3). The permit shadow price settles at 252 $/tC (see Figure 4).  Figure 4 illustrates how 
shadow prices vary between a randomly chosen pair of buyer and seller during 
subsequent transactions until equilibrium is reached. As Table 3 shows, the US 
purchases the most (yi = 201 MtC/yr), while the EEFSU can sell the most (yi =  
-437 MtC/yr). The other Kyoto participant that can sell emission permits is CANZ 
(5 MtC/yr). Total abatement cost for all participants amount to 166 631 MUS$/yr. 
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Compared to the situation before trade (278 238 MUS$/yr), this represents a reduction 
of 40%. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Traded permits yi for five Kyoto regions. As Kyoto regions are randomly 
selected to trade permits bilaterally, particular realizations differ. However, 
they always end up in the same equilibrium (with αi and γi < 0.25) as 
specified in Table 3, thus the same amount of traded emission permits yi. 
Table 3: With reference to Figure 2: equilibrium after sequential bilateral trade. 
 Emission Relative 
uncertainty
Shadow 
price 
Permits 
traded Total cost αi γi 
Variable Fi* Ri* λi yi ( ) ( )*,*, iiRiiF RcFc +    
Units MtC/yr 1 $/tC MtC/yr MUS$ 1 1 
US 1313 0.106 252 201 74 803 6.93 0.71 
OECDE 873 0.177 252 169 26 881 5.95 0.83 
Japan 292 0.131 252 72 8 946 7.23 0.82 
CANZ 180 0.157 252 -5 20 250 4.03 0.56 
EEFSU 696 0.258 252 -437 35 749 4.23 0.75 
Total    0 166 631   
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Figure 3: With reference to Figure 2: The values that the parameters αi and γi take on 
during the transaction process.  
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Figure 4: Convergence of permit shadow prices at 252 $/tC for a randomly chosen pair 
of buyer and seller of emission permits. 
It is noted that the analysis exhibits two major potential drawbacks: (1) due to the lack 
of data, combining countries to aggregated Kyoto regions may be too simplistic; the 
same is true of how costs for reducing relative uncertainty are modeled, and (2) 
including the US as one of the Kyoto participants, which can be considered unlikely in 
the foreseeable future, pushes permit prices in our simulation. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
Emission inventories show what should be considered under emissions trading, which is 
the starting point for this study. The goal of this study is to consider a market-based 
mechanism that encourages the reduction of inventory uncertainty taking into account 
the formal dependence between emission and uncertainty reduction. The rules 
governing the reduction of the two are the following: emissions plus (absolute) 
uncertainty have to be equal to the Kyoto target plus the net amount of permits. The 
Kyoto target can be met by buying permits or reducing emissions or reducing 
uncertainty in relative terms.  
The most important analytical finding is that, under the outlined framework, the market 
may not reach the least-cost solution on its own. Instead, local minimum solutions may 
prevail as a consequence of non-convexities when introducing the notion of a cost 
function for relative uncertainty reduction. Trapping under local minimum conditions 
leads to an undesirable situation as a central agency with perfect knowledge about the 
participants’ cost curves would be required.  
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We derive the necessary conditions for non-convexity if we assume quadratic abatement 
cost functions. We conclude that the Kyoto carbon market would not suffer from non-
convexity. The applied procedure of sequential bilateral trade converges to the market 
equilibrium. The carbon market is simulated for five Kyoto regions and it should be 
considered as illustrative. The aggregated Kyoto target for all regions amounts to 3 898 
MtC/yr. Meeting this target without trade, that is, only by considering the reduction of 
emissions and relative uncertainty, would cost 278 238 MUS$/yr. As a result of trading, 
these costs can be decreased by about 40% to 166 631 MUS$/yr. 
It should be stressed that the necessary conditions for non-convexity (α < 0.25 and γ < 0.25) are only valid for the case considered in this study, that is, the use of quadratic 
cost functions for the reduction of emissions and uncertainty. However, the numerical 
exercise exhibits values for α and γ that are far above the threshold of 0.25 (especially α 
being up to 7.3). It can be expected that such favorable conditions also exist when 
applying more general (non-quadratic) approximations for the cost functions.  
To account for all Kyoto gases more appropriately, an approach that considers the 
calculation of costs to reduce uncertainty in relative as well as absolute terms appears to 
be the next step ahead. This study analyzes market convergence properties for the first 
case which, however, considers the formal dependence that exists between the reduction 
of emissions and uncertainty. 
Also, the results of Godal et al. (2003), who simulated costs for the case of reducing 
uncertainty in absolute terms, should not be compared with the results provided in this 
study, which considers the case of reducing uncertainty in relative terms. This 
comparison would not be appropriate because of the different data applied. More 
importantly, in both studies cost functions of uncertainty reduction have been 
parameterized in a simplified way. 
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